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Abstract
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) has recently gathered much research interest from both
academia and industry as a key enabler of energy harvesting Internet-of-things (IoT) networks. Due to a number of growing use
cases of such networks, it is important to study their performance limits from the perspective of physical layer security (PLS).
With this intent, this work aims to provide a novel analysis of the ergodic secrecy capacity of a SWIPT system is provided
for Rician and Nakagami-m faded communication links. For a realistic evaluation of the system, the imperfections of channel
estimations for different receiver designs of the SWIPT-based IoT systems have been taken into account. Subsequently, the closed-
form expressions of the ergodic secrecy capacities for the considered scenario are provided and, then, validated through extensive
simulations. The results indicate that an error ceiling appears due to imperfect channel estimation at high values of signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). More importantly, the secrecy capacity under different channel conditions stops increasing beyond a certain limit,
despite an increase of the main link SNR. The in-depth analysis of secrecy-energy trade-off has also been performed and a
comparison has been provided for imperfect and perfect channel estimation cases. As part of the continuous evolution of IoT
networks, the results provided in this work can help in identifying the secrecy limits of IoT networks in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-things (IoT) is gradually maturing due to a considerable amount of research interest received in recent years
[1]. It seems evident that the myriad applications of IoT in healthcare, industrial automation, and agriculture, are going to
usher an era of massive connectivity of millions of devices. According to the researchers, the increase in IT consolidation
and the rapid adoption of reliable solutions are some of the main contributors to such massive connectivity of wireless IoT
devices [2]. Modernization of legacy infrastructure is another focal point to provide seamlessly connected solutions that have
a significant impact on the performance of such massive IoT networks. In this regard, ensuring the security of the IoT devices
is at the forefront of critical issues. Due to this reason, a great number of research efforts are directed towards securing IoT
devices against a number of attacks [3]. Another important aspect of such networks is energy consumption and reliability
on rechargeable battery solutions. In particular, there is a growing demand to develop energy harvesting solutions to reduce
the dependency and consumption of fossil fuels and move towards green communications [4]. To ensure such ubiquitous
connectivity of green IoT networks, several interesting yet daunting issues need to be addressed for future IoT networks.
The first challenge stems in the form of prevention against eavesdropping attacks. Due to broadcast nature, it seems inevitable
that the wireless links among IoT devices would be susceptible to the eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, since many of the IoT
networks may operate privately in ad-hoc mode, the security techniques involving a trusted third party may not be realizable.
In this regard, one of the promising solutions has been proposed in the form of physical layer security (PLS). The basic
principle of PLS is to ensure link security by harnessing the randomness of the wireless channel [5]. This randomness of the
wireless channel can be used to confuse the eavesdropper and reliably transfer the message to the intended receiver. Moreover,
it can ensure good communication secrecy without requiring exhaustive cryptographic operations [6]. Besides this, message
authentication can also be performed for ensuring the confidentiality of messages in the presence of malicious IoT devices.
The second issue is related to the limited life-cycle of wireless devices which can be addressed by employing efficient energy
harvesting techniques [7]. The term energy harvesting which is sometimes called power harvesting is a technique that allows
devices to harvest energy from already available sources. For RF energy harvesting, these sources include radio, cellular and
television broadcasting signals that are mostly available and free to use for harvesting. This idea also gave birth to the transfer
of power and data through electromagnetic (EM) waves [8]. As shown in Figure 1, the transfer of energy can take place using
dedicated or ambient resources in the environment. The dedicated energy harvesting can be performed using dedicated towers
to transfer energy to remote devices, whereas, ambient energy harvesting can be performed using radio frequency (RF) waves
generated from wireless devices and fixed nodes. This dual nature of EM waves (i.e., ability to transfer information and energy)
has given birth to a promising field of research namely simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) [7].
As mentioned earlier, the inherent nature of wireless IoT devices makes them vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks [9]. In
this regard, it is worth noting increasing the power for ensuring the reliability of messages can have a negative impact on
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Fig. 1. RF energy harvesting architectures (a) dedicated energy harvesting (b) ambient energy harvesting.
the secrecy performance of the network. In case, when a power receiver is a malicious IoT device, then improving the power
transfer efficiency can reduce secrecy. It is because by increasing the power of the information signal, one may reduce the
secrecy rate of the wireless links [10]. In this context, few studies have recently explored the concept of PLS and energy
harvesting to efficiently use the transmit power. For instance, the authors of [11] proposed a band allocation scheme, whereby,
the band reserved for energy harvesting cannot be used for information decoding. In another study, the concept of secrecy
design for low-powered devices was proposed and evaluated [12]. They introduced power splitting (PS) and time switching
(TS) techniques for information processing and energy harvesting. Security in full-duplex (FD) relays with SWIPT systems
was studied in [13]. An optimization problem was formulated for minimizing power consumption and ensuring link security
for multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) FD relays. In another work [14], Bi et al. proposed a strategy based on energy
accumulation and then jamming the eavesdropper reception. The authors of [15] provided a secrecy maximization scheme for
energy harvesting relays. They first formulated a utility maximization problem and then solved it with the help of the Lagrange
dual method.
The main contribution of this paper lies in the performance evaluation of energy harvesting and secure IoT. Specifically, we
consider two fading channel models i.e., Rician and Nakagami-m fading. We derive closed-form expressions of ergodic secrecy
capacity for both separated and integrated SWIPT-enabled IoT device architecture. In contrast to the conventional approach,
we consider imperfect channel estimation for both legitimate and eavesdropping links. To validate our findings, we perform
Monte-Carlo simulations in MATLAB.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides details of the considered system model. In Section 3, a
detailed analysis of ergodic secrecy capacity for both Nakagami-m and Rician fading has been provided. Section 4 provides
analytical and simulation results along with their relevant discussion. Lastly, Section 5 presents some key conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a downlink communication network constituting an access point (AP) and N+1 SWIPT-enabled IoT devices.
Within any timeslot, the AP communicates with a legitimate IoT device (S) while the other N IoT devices can be considered as
eavesdroppers denoted as E = {Ei|i = 1, 2, ...N}. All the IoT devices are equipped with single antennas having the capability
to harvest energy and decode information from the received signal. In order to efficiently use the transmitted power from AP,
during each time slot, the AP transmits information to S while the other devices are supposed to harvest energy from the radio
waves. Being part of the same network, the energy harvesting IoT devices may act as eavesdroppers. Furthermore, in order
to decode information and harvest energy S and E are assumed to use PS scheme [16]. As per PS policy, the signal at the
receiving IoT device is divided into two streams for energy harvesting and information decoding. Particularly, the multiplicating
PS factor ρ is used for information decoding and 1− ρ portion of the power is used for harvesting energy.
A. Fading Channel Models
For many tropospheric, urban, sub-urban and indoor communication systems, the channel is an amalgamation of noise, fading,
and interference. Therefore, an appropriate selection of the channel fading model is important to analyze the performance
of a wireless network. In this context, we adopt two renowned channel fading models namely, Rician and Nakagami-m
distribution, for characterization of secrecy performance of SWIPT-enabled IoT devices. Rice distribution has been used to
model environments where a strong stable line of sight component exists between source and destination. The theoretical model
is the sum of two vectors, one with Rayleigh distributed modulus and other with known modulus with a large value. The
Nakagami-m distribution is a multi-faceted distribution which is used to model numerous fading environments. It has proven
to be highly flexible for matching empirical data of indoor and outdoor environments. It includes Rayleigh and One-sided
Gaussian as special cases. Some studies also indicate that Nakagami-m can be used to approximate Rician fading for its shape
parameter m >> 1 [17].
B. Signal Propagation
When AP, with power P , transmits its signal s to S, the received signal is written as [18]
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P
P losss
hˆss+ ns
)
+ zs, (1)
where hˆs is the wireless channel gain between S and AP, and ρs is the PS factor for S. The signal processing noise is denoted
as zs, ns is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) given as N (0, σ2s ) and P losss is the path loss. As explained earlier, the
communication is overheard by the eavesdropping IoT devices. At the i-th eavesdropper, the received signal is expressed as
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P
P lossie
hˆies+ nie
)
+ zie, (2)
where hˆie is the channel gain and P
loss
ie is the path loss, zie represents the signal processing noise, and nie denotes the
AWGN between the AP and i-th eavesdropper. We assume that the eavesdropper use similar hardware and σ2ie = σ
2
e ∀ E. For
tractability of analysis, we consider nie = ne and ρie = ρe and P
loss
ie = P
loss
e , ∀ i ∈ N . In this paper, we consider imperfect
channel estimation which is more practical as it is generally difficult to perfectly estimate wireless channel. Thus, a renowned
channel estimation model has been used to incorporate channel imperfections in our system [19], [20]
hˆk =
√
1− δ2khk + δkv, (3)
where hk is the estimated wireless channel gain and k ∈ (s, ie). Also, δk denotes the channel accuracy factor wherein for
δk = 0 the channel is assumed to be accurately known and for δk = 1 the channel estimation is completely inaccurate.
Moreover, v is given by N (0, 1). Since we are focusing on the secrecy performance evaluation of the system, we assume that
the value of δk is given a priori. By substituting above equation in (2) we obtain
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P (1− δ2s)
P losss
hss+
√
P
P losss
δsvs+ ns
)
+ zs, (4)
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P (1− δ2ie)
P losse
hies+
√
P
P losse
δievs+ nie
)
+ zie. (5)
Using above equations, the instantaneous received SNR S can be expressed as
γs =
ρsΩs(1− δ2s )
(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s )
|hs|2, (6)
Similarly, the instantaneous received SNR at any eavesdropper is written as
γie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2ie)
(Ωeρsδ2ie + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
|hie|2, (7)
where Ωs = P/(P
loss
s ) and Ωe = P/(P
loss
e ) are the average transmit power of main and wiretap link in (6) and (7), respectively.
It is worth mentioning that among all the eavesdroppers, an eavesdropper with the best CSI has a better chance to decode the
received message. Thus, the received SNR of eavesdropping link yields
γe = max
i∈N
γie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2e)
(Ωeρsδ2e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
max
i∈N
|hie|2. (8)
III. ERGODIC SECRECY CAPACITY
An important security indicator is the average secrecy capacity Csec. It is expressed as
C¯sec = E{Csec} = E{[Cs − Ce]+}. (9)
Now, we first discuss both channels separately.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity under Rician Fading
1) Separated S and E: By using (9) we get
C¯sec = E{[log2(1 + γs)− log2(1 + γe)]+}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γs
0
[log2(1 + u)− log(1 + v)]fγe(v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1
× fγs(u)du. (10)
Now by using integration by parts, we get
G1 = 1
ln 2
∫ u
0
Fγe(v)
1 + v
dv. (11)
Replacing (11) in (10) and changing the order of integration, we obtain
C¯sec =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe(v)
1 + v
[∫ ∞
v
fγs(v)du
]
dv
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe(v)
1 + v
[1− Fγs(v)]dv. (12)
Using [21], the probability density function (PDF) of the legitimate link is written as
fγs(γs) =
(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s )(Ks + 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
× exp
(
− (Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s )(Ks + 1)γs
ρs(1− δ2s )γ¯s
)
× I0
(
2
√
(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)Ks(Ks + 1)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
× exp (−Ks) . (13)
Similarly, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the received SNR at S is given as
Fγs(γs) =
1−Q1
(√
2Ks,
√
2(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(Ks + 1)γs
ρs(1− δ2s )γ¯s
)
, (14)
where γ¯s = ΩsE{|hs|2} denotes the mean value, I0(.) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and order zero [22]
and Q is the Marcum-Q function [22] which is given as
Q1(a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
x exp(− (x
2 + a2)
2
)I0(ax)dx. (15)
Additionally, Ks is the ratio of the main link’s power of the line of sight component to the scattered component.
By substituting (14) in (12), we get (16) at the top of next page. Now with the help of [22, (1.211.1),(3.194.3)], ergodic
secrecy capacity can be obtained as
C¯Sp−Spsec =
1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
× exp

−z exp(υ(√2Ke)){2(Ke + 1)(Ωeρeδ2e + ρeN0 + σ2e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
}µ(√2Ke)
2


× exp

− exp(υ(√2Ks)){2(Ks + 1)(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ2s )γe
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
}µ(√2Ks)
2

dγe. (16)
C¯Sp−Insec =
1
ln 2
×
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z ×
∫ ∞
0
1
Cγe
× exp

−z exp(υ(√2Ke)) [2(Ke + 1)(Ωeρeδ2e + ρeN0 + σ2e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1 − δ2e)
]µ(√2Ke)
2


× exp

− exp(υ(√2Ks)) [2(Ks + 1)(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ2s )γe
ρs(1− δ2s )γ¯s
]µ(√2Ks)
2

dγe. (19)
C¯
Sp−Sp
sec =
1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)zB
(
µ(
√
2Ke)
2
,−µ(
√
2Ke)
2
)
×

1− z exp(υ(√2Ke))
{
2(Ke + 1)(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
}µ(√2Ke)
2


− 1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z ×B
(
µ(
√
2Ks)
2
,−µ(
√
2Ks)
2
)
× exp(υ(
√
2Ks))
[
2(Ks + 1)(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]µ(√2Ks)
2
. (17)
where B(., .) is the incomplete Beta function [22].
2) Separated S and Integrated E: Using the method presented above sub-section, we can easily derive the expression of
ergodic secrecy capacity when S and E employ separated and integrated receivers, respectively. It is given by
C¯sec =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe(v)
Cv
[1− Fγs(v)]dv. (18)
Replacing (14) in (18) yields (19) at the top of next page. Using [22, (3.194.3)] along with Marcum Q approximation in
(19), we get
C¯
Sp−In
sec =
1
C ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z ×
[
B
(
µ(
√
2Ke)
2
,−µ(
√
2Ke)
2
)
×

1 − z exp(υ(
√
2Ke))
(
2(Ke + 1)
(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
)µ(√2Ke)
2


− exp(υ(
√
2Ks))
(
2(Ks + 1)
(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)µ(√2Ks)
2
×B
(
µ(
√
2Ks)
2
,−µ(
√
2Ks)
2
)]
. (20)
B. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity under Nakagami-m Fading
The PDF of the main link is written as [23]
fγs(γs) =
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s )
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
×
(γs)
ms−1 exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ2s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
, (21)
Similarly, the CDF of received SNR at S is expressed as
Fγs(γs) = 1− exp
(
−
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)ms−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]r
. (22)
where ms represents the total number of multipath clusters for main link. Using the derivation for CDF and PDF of above
section, we get CDF as
Fγe(γe) =
[
1− exp
(
−
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]r]N
, (23)
In a similar way, the PDF of γe is obtained as
fγe(γe) =
N(γe)
me−1
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
[
1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
{
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1 − δ2e)γ¯e
}r]N−1
× exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1 − δ2e)γ¯e
)
. (24)
where me represents the total number of multipath clusters for wiretap link.
1) Separated S and E: By replacing (22) and (23) in (12), we obtain
C¯Sp−SPsec =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe(γe)
1 + γe
[1− Fγs(γe)]dγe
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
[
1− exp
(
− (Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
{
(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1 − δ2e)
}r]N
× Γ
(
ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s )γe
ρs(1− δ2s )γ¯s
)
dγe. (25)
Using [22, (8.352.4)] we obtain
C¯
Sp−SP
sec =
1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
me−1∑
a=0
×
ms−1∑
b=0
(me − 1)!(ms − 1)!
(a!)zb!
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
× exp
(
−a (Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
− ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γe
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
× (Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γ
2
e
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
dγe. (26)
According to the author’s best knowledge, the above integral cannot be further simplified. But it can be readily evaluated
with MATLAB, Mathematica or any other standard computational software.
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Fig. 2. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity for Rician and Nakagami-m channels when (a) S and E employ separated design for receivers (b) S employs separated
and E use integrated design for receivers.
2) Separated S and Integrated E: Substituting (22) and (23) in (18) yields
C¯
Sp−In
sec =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe (γe)
Cγe
[1− Fγs (γe)]dγe.
=
1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
me−1∑
a=0
ms−1∑
b=0
(me − 1)!(ms − 1)!
C(a!)zb!
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−a (Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1− δ2e)
− ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γe
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
× mems(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γe
ρeρs(1− δ2e)γ¯e(1− δ2s)γ¯s
dγe. (27)
Now with the help of [22, (3.326.2)], we get
C¯Sp−Insec =
1
ln 2
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
me−1∑
a=0
ms−1∑
b=0
× (me − 1)!(ms − 1)![
a
(Ωeρeδ2e+ρeN0+σ
2
e)γe
ρeγ¯e(1−δ2e) −
ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γe
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
]
C(a!)zb!
. (28)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides some numerical examples for the derived analytical results, which are also validated by simulations.
Unless stated otherwise, the simulation parameters for generation of plots in this section are provided in Table I.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
S No. Parameter Value
1. Signal processing noise variance σ2s = σ
2
e 0 dB
2. Nakagami-m shape factor ms = me 2
3. Channel realizations 105
4. Antenna noise variance N0 0.1 dB
5. Rician K factor Ks = Ke 5
6. Main link power Ωs 30 dB
7. Channel estimation accuracy δs = δe 0.2
8. No. of eavesdroppers N 5
9. Wiretap link power Ωe 10 dB
10. Power splitting factor ρs = ρe 0.8
Figure 2 (a) plots the ergodic secrecy capacity against increasing γ¯s. Note that the ergodic secrecy capacity generally
increases with the increase in γ¯s. However, the increase in secrecy capacity is hampered due to imperfect channel estimation
errors. Moreover, we observe that for particular values of ms = me and Ks = Ke, the secrecy capacity for Rician and
Nakagami-m channel becomes similar when a large number of eavesdroppers are present in the network. Figure 2 (b) further
shows the impact receiver design on secrecy performance of energy harvesting IoT devices. The secrecy capacity for Rician
and Nakagami-m channel becomes the same despite the large difference in their shape parameters when S and E are equipped
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Fig. 3. Secrecy-energy region with S and E using separated design of receivers, where, ζ = 0.9.
with separated and integrated receivers. This shows that the impact of wireless channel reduces when S employs separated
and E employ integrated receiver architecture.
Figure 3 plots the secrecy-energy region for Nakagami-m and Rician fading channels. It can be observed that ideal channel
estimation always achieves better secrecy-energy pair than that of imperfect channel estimation with δs = δe = 0.1. Moreover,
when N increases from 10 to 15, the secrecy-energy performance significantly decreases. This shows that no. of eavesdroppers
have a significant impact on a secrecy-energy pair. Furthermore, the gap between Nakagami-m and Rician channel shrinks for
large no. of eavesdroppers.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to meet the future requirements of IoT networks, it is imperative that secure and environment-friendly solutions are
proposed. With this intent, we have analyzed an information and power transfer IoT network from the link security perspective.
Particularly, we derived closed-form expressions of ergodic secrecy capacity for two small-scale fading models. We also adopted
a more practical approach by considering the availability of imperfect channel information at the transmitter. It was shown
that the secrecy performance considerably deteriorates under imperfect channel estimation. In other words, an error ceiling
is introduced whereby the secrecy capacity cannot be increased more even with the improvements in the SNR of the main
link. This trend was observed for different receiver architectures of energy-harvesting IoT devices. Moreover, an increase in
the number of eavesdroppers or channel estimation errors causes a significant reduction in the secrecy-energy region for both
Rician and Nakagami-m channels. These findings can be considered important from the design perspective of secure RF energy
harvesting future networks.
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